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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

TRANSPORTING PADILLA TO DEPORTATION PROCEEDINGS:
A DUE PROCESS RIGHT TO THE EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
COUNSEL

STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY*
INTRODUCTION
In the immigration sphere, issues as to the effectiveness of counsel
typically arise in two contexts. In one context, a noncitizen claims that counsel
was ineffective during the course of deportation proceedings.1 In the other, a
noncitizen criminal defendant claims that counsel’s deficient advice led the
noncitizen to plead guilty to a crime that, in turn, put him or her at risk of
deportation.
The Supreme Court’s landmark decision in Padilla v. Kentucky2
transformed that second terrain. Before Padilla, deportation was merely a
“collateral” consequence of a criminal conviction; because deportation was not
part of the criminal sentence, it was not held to be a “direct” consequence.3
That distinction stemmed from the traditional view that a deportation order is a
* The John S. Lehmann University Professor, Washington University School of Law. Since
October 2011, the author has been on leave as Chief Counsel of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration
Services (USCIS), U.S. Department of Homeland Security. This article was written, submitted,
accepted for publication, and posted on the Social Science Research Network before the author’s
appointment at USCIS. The views expressed are solely those of the author in his personal
capacity, not those of the agency.
1. Before 1996, the statute distinguished “exclusion” proceedings, in which the government
sought to bar a noncitizen from entering the United States, from “deportation” proceedings, in
which the government sought to expel a noncitizen who had already entered the country. In
1996, Congress replaced both “exclusion” and “deportation” with the new statutory term
“removal.” See Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L.
No. 104-208, § 304(a)(3), 110 Stat. 3009 (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. § 1229a (2006))
(adding language regarding removal proceedings to determine inadmissibility or deportability to
Immigration and Nationality Act section 240). In this Article, I use the term “deportation” to
refer only to the latter kind of proceeding.
2. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
3. For this reason, the lower courts have uniformly rejected requests to withdraw guilty
pleas based on the trial judge’s failure to disclose the potential deportation consequences of their
pleas, absent statutory requirements to the contrary. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of
Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 469, 516–17 (2007).
43
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civil penalty rather than a criminal punishment.4 The difference was critical
because lower courts had divided over whether counsel’s erroneous advice
concerning the collateral consequences of a guilty plea, or counsel’s failure to
advise about those consequences at all, breaches the defendant’s Sixth
Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel.5
In Padilla, seven of the nine Justices held that erroneous advice concerning
the deportation consequences of a guilty plea can constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel for Sixth Amendment purposes.6 The same seven
Justices held that the Sixth Amendment also affirmatively obligates defense
counsel to advise a noncitizen defendant that pleading guilty might lead to
deportation.7 The five-Justice majority went a step further, requiring defense
counsel to spell out deportation consequences more precisely when they are
clear.8
To reach its decision, the Padilla Court had to revisit the longstanding
judicial dogma that deportation is purely a “collateral” consequence.9 As the
Court discovered, deportation cannot be so neatly separated from the criminal
sentence. Rather, the Court saw deportation as a kind of hybrid, a different
animal that challenged the traditional dichotomy.10 The Court’s difficulty in
classifying deportation as “direct” or “collateral” led it to question whether the
distinction had any place at all in Sixth Amendment jurisprudence, an issue
that the “unique nature of deportation”11 enabled the Court to defer.
The effects of Padilla have spread far beyond deportation. As the two
dissenters predicted,12 the decision immediately spurred analogous Sixth
Amendment challenges—many of them successful—to the validity of guilty

4. Id. at 511–15.
5. See generally Rob A. Justman, The Effects of AEDPA and IIRIRA on Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel Claims for Failure to Advise Alien Defendants of Deportation
Consequences of Pleading Guilty to an “Aggravated Felony,” 2004 UTAH L. REV. 701 (2004).
Lower courts were somewhat more receptive to claims based on erroneous advice than to those
based on a failure to advise at all. See, e.g., United States v. Del Rosario, 902 F.2d 55, 59 n.2
(D.C. Cir. 1990); In re Resendiz, 19 P.3d 1171, 1174 (Cal. 2001).
6. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482; id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring). To withdraw the plea, the
defendant must also show prejudice in addition to deficient counsel. Strickland v. Washington,
466 U.S. 668, 692 (1984). Because that issue had not been litigated below, the Court remanded
for a prejudice determination. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1487.
7. Id. at 1486; id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring).
8. Id. at 1483 (majority opinion). Justice Alito and Chief Justice Roberts would have
required disclosure that deportation was possible but no further advice concerning the likelihood
or the specifics. Id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring).
9. See Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1892); Bugajewitz v. Adams,
228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
10. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
11. Id. at 1481.
12. Id. at 1496 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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pleas that were entered after counsel’s deficient advice concerning a wide
range of other collateral consequences.13 Developments are unfolding rapidly,
and scholarly commentary has already begun to accumulate.14
While Padilla continues to inspire rapid-fire changes for deportationrelated duties of criminal defense counsel, similar drama has been unfolding in
the other immigration arena in which counsel’s effectiveness is commonly
contested—counsel’s performance during the deportation proceedings
themselves. Because deportation proceedings are not formally criminal, the
Sixth Amendment is inapplicable.15 Still, the Board of Immigration Appeals
(hereinafter “B.I.A.”) and the courts have long held that Fifth Amendment due
process provides a right to counsel in deportation proceedings, albeit not
necessarily at government expense.16 Congress has given that right statutory
recognition.17 The B.I.A. and most courts have also assumed that the
constitutional right to counsel implies a constitutional right to effective counsel,
at least when the proceeding would otherwise be “fundamentally unfair.”18
In 2009, however, Attorney General Mukasey, exercising his power to
review decisions of the B.I.A.,19 decided Matter of Compean.20 He held that
there is no due process or other constitutional right to the effective assistance
of counsel in deportation proceedings,21 although he did acknowledge the
discretionary power of immigration adjudicators to reopen deportation

13. See, e.g., Kimberly Atkins, Defense Counsel’s Duty to Warn About . . . Everything?:
‘Padilla’ Ruling by U.S. Supreme Court Extending Far Beyond Deportation Cases, LAW. WKLY.
USA, Nov. 8, 2010; see also Gabriel J. Chin & Margaret Colgate Love, Status as Punishment: A
Critical Guide to Padilla v. Kentucky (Ariz. Legal Studies, Discussion Paper No. 10-21, 2010)
(forecasting and praising the extension of Padilla to other contexts previously dismissed as
collateral).
14. See supra note 13 and the other articles included in this publication; see also Gabriel J.
Chin, Making Padilla Practical: Defense Counsel and Collateral Consequences at Guilty Plea, 54
HOW. L.J. 675, 675–78 (2011); Anita Ortiz Maddali, Padilla v. Kentucky: A New Chapter in
Supreme Court Jurisprudence on Whether Deportation Constitutes Punishment for Lawful
Permanent Residents?, 61 AM. U. L. REV. 1 (2011).
15. See In re Magallanes-Damian v. INS, 783 F.2d 931, 933 (9th Cir. 1986).
16. See, e.g., id.; Paul v. INS, 521 F.2d 194, 197–98 (5th Cir. 1975); In re Lozada, 19 I. &
N. Dec. 637, 638 (B.I.A. 1988), aff’d, Lozada v. INS, 857 F.2d 10 (1st Cir. 1988).
17. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006); id. § 1362.
18. See, e.g., Lozada, 19 I. & N. Dec. at 638; Nehad v. Mukasey, 535 F.3d 962, 967 (9th Cir.
2008); Aris v. Mukasey, 517 F.3d 595, 600–01 (2d Cir. 2008); Zeru v. Gonzales, 503 F.3d 59, 72
(1st Cir. 2007); Fadiga v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 488 F.3d 142, 155 (3d Cir. 2007); Sene v. Gonzales,
453 F.3d 383, 386 (6th Cir. 2006); Dakane v. U.S. Att’y Gen., 399 F.3d 1269, 1274 (11th Cir.
2005). Some have rejected such a right. See, e.g., Rafiyev v. Mukasey, 536 F.3d 853, 861 (8th
Cir. 2008); Afanwi v. Mukasey, 526 F.3d 788, 798–99 (4th Cir. 2008); Magala v. Gonzales, 434
F.3d 523, 525 (7th Cir. 2005).
19. 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(h) (2009).
20. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710 (A.G. 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009).
21. Id. at 714.
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proceedings upon a showing of “egregious” incompetence of counsel.22 In
addition, he imposed new substantive and procedural constraints on the
adjudicators’ discretion to reopen.23 That decision was short-lived. Attorney
General Holder vacated the decision later the same year, on grounds not
relevant here, but declined to address the constitutional issue.24
The purpose of this Article is to link these two lines of cases. My thesis is
that the logic of Padilla, quite apart from its sweeping implications for the
constitutional duties of criminal defense counsel, also helps resolve the
constitutional issue left unsettled by Compean and its overruling: Is there a
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in deportation
proceedings?
This issue assumes heightened importance in an era in which annual
removal proceedings now number in the hundreds of thousands.25 The Justice
Department’s Executive Office for Immigration Review, the umbrella agency
that houses the immigration judges who preside over removal proceedings,26
reported that in 2008 approximately 42% of the respondents in those
proceedings were represented by counsel.27 In removal cases that involve
asylum, roughly two-thirds of the applicants in fiscal year 1999 had managed
to procure counsel.28 As discussed further below,29 representation by counsel
greatly increases the respondent’s chance of success, both generally30 and in

22. Id. at 728.
23. Id. at 732–39.
24. Attorney General Holder felt that the rulemaking process would be a more appropriate
vehicle for reevaluating the administrative framework previously in place. In re Compean, 25 I.
& N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009). For some useful pre-Padilla commentary on Compean and its
overruling, see Jean Pierre Espinoza, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings –
Matter of Compean and the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine, 22 FLA. J. INT’L L. 65 (2010); Aliza
B. Kaplan, A New Approach to Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal Proceedings, 62
RUTGERS L. REV. 345 (2010).
25. Over 318,000 removal proceedings were initiated in fiscal year 2010. U.S. DEP’T OF
JUSTICE, FY 2010 STATISTICAL YEARBOOK C3 tbl.3 (2011), available at http://www.justice.
gov/eoir/statspub/fy10syb.pdf.
26. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.9(a), 1003.10(a) (2010).
27. More Than Half of Immigration Respondents Without Work, 85 INTERPRETER RELEASES
2445 (2008).
28. Andrew I. Schoenholtz & Jonathan Jacobs, The State of Asylum Representation: Ideas
for Change, 16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 739, 772 tbl.7 (2002). “Affirmative” asylum applications are
first adjudicated by the USCIS asylum officers, and the representation rates at those interviews
are lower — 34% in fiscal year 1999. Id. at 770 tbl.6. Because this Article is concerned solely
with representation in removal proceedings, those data are less relevant, even though more than
80% of all the asylum claims filed in removal proceedings during the period studied originated in
the USCIS asylum offices. Id. at 742.
29. See infra notes 51–53 and accompanying text.
30. Donald Kerwin, Charitable Legal Programs for Immigrants: What They Do, Why They
Matter and How They Can Be Expanded, IMMIGR. BRIEFINGS, June 2004, at 6.
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asylum cases.31 There would be little reason to expect such a correlation
unless the representation is at least minimally effective. Sadly, it often is not.32
Since even Attorney General Mukasey’s opinion in Compean recognized
the discretionary power of immigration adjudicators to reopen deportation
proceedings in cases of ineffective assistance,33 one might ask why it matters
whether the ineffective assistance claim in deportation proceedings is of
constitutional stature. There are several reasons. First, the governing statute
recognizes a right to counsel in deportation proceedings but does not speak
explicitly to whether that right encompasses effective assistance.34 It was that
ambiguity that left Attorney General Mukasey free to define the statutory
power of adjudicators to redress ineffective assistance as narrowly as he
wished. And if Compean is any indication, his wish was to define that power
narrowly indeed.35 The scope of the adjudicators’ authority can thus swing
back and forth each time the Administration changes hands—precisely the
scenario illustrated by the Compean decision and its subsequent overruling.
Second, without constitutional constraints, Congress itself could define the
prerequisites to ineffective assistance claims in such narrow terms that very
few errors by counsel would be cognizable. Alternatively, Congress could
explicitly provide that any claim of ineffective assistance rests solely on the
power of the Attorney General to set the parameters and the discretion of the
adjudicators to apply them. More radically still, Congress could entirely bar
motions to reopen deportation proceedings based on claims of ineffective
assistance. Constitutionalizing the right to effective assistance in deportation
proceedings thus insulates the right itself from shifting political winds in an
increasingly inflammatory environment. It also ensures a meaningful judicial
role in reviewing any substantive or procedural prerequisites that Congress, the
Attorney General, or the immigration adjudicators should choose to impose.
Section I of this Article suggests that Attorney General Mukasey’s
conclusions in Compean rested on shaky ground even before Padilla. Section
II considers the pre-Padilla evolution of the theory that deportation is not
punishment. In Section III, I argue that Padilla now offers support for
recognizing a due process right to the effective assistance of counsel in
deportation cases.

31. Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 28, at 743–45.
32. See In re Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 728 (A.G. 2009) (citing judicial commentary
on lapses by attorneys representing noncitizens in removal proceedings), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec.
1 (A.G. 2009).
33. Id. at 739–41.
34. 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (2006).
35. See infra note 41.
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I. COMPEAN BEFORE PADILLA
Attorney General Mukasey’s decision in Matter of Compean consolidated
three cases.36 In each, an undocumented immigrant had appealed the B.I.A.’s
refusal to reopen removal proceedings.37 Each argued ineffective assistance of
retained counsel in connection with their applications for affirmative relief
from removal.38 Disapproving two earlier B.I.A. precedents, the Attorney
General announced that there was no Fifth Amendment due process right to the
effective assistance of counsel in removal proceedings.39 Nor, he added, is
there a statutory right to effective assistance in those proceedings.40 He
acknowledged that immigration judges and the B.I.A. have the discretion to
reopen removal proceedings and that the “deficient performance” of counsel is
a permissible ground for exercising that discretion, but even as to that, he
imposed new and more demanding substantive and procedural prerequisites to
doing so.41
Even before Padilla, Attorney General Mukasey’s conclusion that the
Constitution provides no right to the effective assistance of counsel in
deportation proceedings rested on some thin reeds. Two broad themes can be
distilled from Compean. The dominant theme was that the absence of a
constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel somehow follows
from the absence of a right, in deportation proceedings, of governmentappointed counsel. Surely, this is a non sequitur. Let us assume arguendo that
Congress can constitutionally deny appointed counsel in deportation

36. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710.
37. Id. at 714–16.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 727.
40. Id.
41. Substantively, counsel’s error must be “egregious”; the motion to reopen must have been
filed within the relevant time limits unless the movant can show due diligence in discovering and
seeking to cure counsel’s errors; and the movant must establish that the lawyer’s shortcomings
prejudiced the outcome. Id. at 732–33. The prejudice standard, the Attorney General held,
requires a showing that but for the errors of counsel, the movant “more likely than not” would
have been “entitled to the ultimate relief he was seeking.” Id. at 734. Procedurally, the movant
must submit a detailed affidavit setting out all the relevant facts, including the lawyer’s
deficiencies and the harm they caused. Id. at 735. In addition, the movant must submit five
documents: (1) a copy of the attorney-client agreement or a statement in the affidavit describing
what the lawyer had agreed to do; (2) a letter to former counsel setting out the alleged
deficiencies and counsel’s reply, if there was one; (3) a completed and signed (but not necessarily
filed) complaint to the appropriate disciplinary authority; (4) a copy of the evidence or arguments
that the movant faults counsel for failing to offer; and (5) a signed statement by the current
attorney (if there is one) stating his or her belief that former counsel’s performance fell below
minimal professional standards. Id. at 736–39 (modifying the various requirements from criteria
previously announced by the B.I.A. in In re Lozada).
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proceedings.42 Why should the fact that the government is not obligated to
appoint counsel mean that those noncitizens who obtain private counsel
without the government’s help have no right to effective assistance? Perhaps
Attorney General Mukasey thought it unfair that those wealthy enough to
afford private counsel would thus acquire a constitutional right unavailable to
the indigent. But the question is not one of differential treatment. It is simply
the reality that the effective assistance issue does not arise in pro se cases.
A separate theme of the Mukasey opinion appears to be that, for due
process purposes, the actions of private counsel are not government action.
For this line of argument, the Attorney General relied on dictum in Shelley v.
Kraemer to the effect that due process does not apply to private conduct.43
Indeed it does not, but more than private conduct is involved here, and on that
score Shelley is a surprising choice of cases. That eminent decision is best
known for its holding that the use of the courts to enforce a racially
discriminatory land covenant would qualify as state action.44 In the present
context, the use of the immigration court and the B.I.A. to effect a deportation
resulting from the ineffective assistance of counsel would similarly be state
action.45 If that state action renders the proceeding fundamentally unfair—a
question of fact—then due process should be held to have been violated.
Those two themes—the absence of a right to appointed counsel and the
absence of government action—are not entirely independent of one another. If
there were a due process right to appointed counsel in removal proceedings
and the government were to deny the respondent that right, then perhaps one
could impute privately retained counsel’s ineffective assistance to the
government, thus supplying the government action essential to a due process
claim. But the converse does not follow. As Shelley v. Kraemer illustrates, the
judgment of a court can supply the requisite state action whether or not the
government was constitutionally required to appoint counsel in the first place.
In Mathews v. Eldridge, the Supreme Court laid out the factors that courts
must generally weigh in determining whether due process requires a particular
procedural safeguard in an administrative adjudication:

42. In some non-criminal contexts, there is a constitutional right to government-appointed
counsel. See, e.g., Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973) (requiring appointed counsel in
proceedings to revoke parole); In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967) (requiring appointment of counsel
in juvenile delinquency proceedings).
43. Compean, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 717 (citing Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 13 (1948)).
44. Shelley, 334 U.S. at 20.
45. Professor Kaplan makes a similar point, observing that in criminal cases the private
status of retained counsel has not prevented the courts from finding state action for purposes of
ineffective assistance claims. Kaplan, supra note 24, at 358. Those decisions cannot be
distinguished on the basis that the Sixth Amendment provides a right to counsel in criminal cases,
because, as she notes, the right to effective assistance of retained counsel in (state) criminal
prosecutions has also been grounded in due process. Id. at 358–59.
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First, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; second, the
risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used,
and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute procedural
safeguards; and finally, the Government’s interest, including the function
involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or
46
substitute procedural requirement would entail.

The nature and magnitude of the private interests at stake in deportation
cases will vary with the circumstances of the respondent. Variables might
include the person’s immigration status—lawful permanent resident, lawfully
present nonimmigrant, other miscellaneous lawful status, or undocumented—
as well as personal circumstances, such as the duration of the person’s
presence in the United States, employment or other financial implications of
deportation, and family and community ties to both the United States and the
country of origin. There is no question, however, that the potential severity of
deportation is extremely high, a point that the Court highlighted in Padilla.47
And when the individual is applying for asylum or for relief under the
Convention Against Torture, an erroneous rejection can result in persecution48
or torture.49
The second Mathews factor is the value of the particular procedural
ingredient, in this case the effective assistance of counsel, in preventing the
erroneous deprivation of that private interest.50 As an empirical matter, there is
today no doubt that representation by counsel correlates positively with
respondents’ likelihood of success in removal proceedings generally51 and in
asylum cases specifically.52
Admittedly, correlation alone does not prove causation. It might well be,
for example, that those noncitizens whose cases are not reasonably “winnable”
are less likely to seek counsel or that counsel are less willing to take on such
cases. It is entirely possible, therefore, that the higher success rates for
represented respondents can be partly attributed to the strength of their claims.

46. 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976).
47. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
48. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42) (2006) (basing “refugee” status on “persecution”); id. §
1158(b)(1)(A) (requiring “refugee” status for asylum).
49. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, arts. 1 & 3, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, 108. Stat. 392, 1465 U.N.T.S. 85 (defining “torture”
and prohibiting return of a person to a State “where there are substantial grounds for believing
that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture”); see also Foreign Affairs Reform and
Restructuring Act of 1998, Pub. L. No.105-277, § 2242(a), 112 Stat. 2681, 822 (stating analogous
U.S. policy).
50. 424 U.S. at 335.
51. Kerwin, supra note 30, at 6.
52. Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 28, at 743–45.
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Even if one assumes a biased sample, however, it would be surprising if,
on average, representation by counsel did not enhance the respondent’s
chances of winning a meritorious case. Counsel can do many things that lay
respondents will ordinarily be ill equipped to do without help or advice. On
questions of fact, counsel can glean the relevant information from the client,
further investigate the facts before the hearing, assemble documents, line up
witnesses, and cross-examine opposing witnesses. A respondent might be
more willing to confide relevant facts to his or her counsel than to the
adjudicator who would decide the case. Immigration law is highly complex;
counsel will be far more likely than a lay person—particularly a lay person
whose foreign origins leave him or her less familiar with American law,
American culture, and even the English language—to understand the relevant
law. Counsel will be better situated to spot issues, identify possible affirmative
remedies and other defenses, research the law, have a sense of which defenses
were successful in previous cases, and present the arguments in an orderly and
convincing fashion. If the respondent is applying for asylum, counsel will be
able to identify and assemble the meticulous documentation essential to
establishing a claim of persecution. Counsel will know when it makes sense to
appeal and when it makes sense to move to reopen or reconsider. Moreover,
the government will always be represented by a specialized attorney whenever
removability is contested;53 the unrepresented respondent will therefore be at a
keen, arguably unfair, disadvantage.
Thus, there are several ways in which counsel can protect the respondent’s
legitimate interests. Each of those benefits is ephemeral, however, if counsel is
incompetent—i.e., if counsel fails to provide effective assistance. Ineffective
assistance might even be worse than no counsel at all. When a noncitizen is
unrepresented, the immigration judge might feel a greater obligation to identify
possible avenues of relief or to ask relevant questions that might put the
alleged grounds for deportation in doubt. In asylum cases, a pro se applicant
might be unfamiliar with the legal elements essential to relief and thus unable
to appreciate what evidence will be necessary to substantiate the claim. A
conscientious adjudicator can ask the relevant questions.
The final Mathews factor is the government’s interest in dispensing with
the particular procedural ingredient.54 Here, the issue is not whether the
government has an interest in declining to provide counsel at public expense.
Rather, the government’s interest is in not insisting that the respondent’s
privately retained counsel render effective assistance. That interest is not
trivial. As Attorney General Mukasey observed in Compean, granting a
motion to reopen removal proceedings on the ground that counsel’s assistance

53. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1240.2(b), 1240.10(d) (2010).
54. Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335.
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was ineffective delays the ultimate resolution of the case;55 moreover, even
meritless motions to reopen burden the adjudication system. As Attorney
General Mukasey emphasized, these considerations take on added weight in
the light of respondents’ inherent incentives to delay the completion of
deportation proceedings in order to prolong their stays in the United States.56
But these are not the only public interests at stake. First, as Attorney
General Mukasey acknowledged, the public also has an interest in assuring
“the fairness and accuracy of removal proceedings.”57 Second, the
immigration judges prefer that respondents be represented by counsel because
counsel can present the cases both more effectively and more efficiently, and
respondents who are represented by counsel are more likely to appear for their
hearings.58 Again, these benefits to the government depend on counsel being
effective.
There are major flaws, then, in both the reasons offered in Compean for
rejecting a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel in
deportation proceedings and in the unacknowledged practical consequences to
which that conclusion leads. In Padilla, the Supreme Court supplied positive
ammunition for the recognition of a constitutional right to the effective
assistance of counsel in deportation proceedings. To understand why this is so,
one must consider how the Court’s conception of deportation has now
fundamentally changed.
II. THE CHARACTER OF DEPORTATION
The idea that deportation is not punishment originated with the Supreme
Court’s 1893 decision in Fong Yue Ting v. United States.59 The case is best
known both for being the first to recognize a congressional power to deport
noncitizens and for apparently disclaiming any judicial authority to impose due
process limits on Congress’s exercise of that power.60 In the same case, the
Court set another process in motion — one that would ultimately preclude the
application of several important constitutional rights to noncitizens in
deportation proceedings. The Court declared that deportation is not a form of
punishment.61 Its sole rationale for that conclusion read as follows:
55. 24 I. & N. Dec. 710, 730 (A.G. 2009), vacated, 25 I. & N. Dec. 1 (A.G. 2009).
56. Id. at 729.
57. Id. at 728.
58. Schoenholtz & Jacobs, supra note 28, at 746.
59. 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893). The evolution of the idea that deportation is not punishment
is laid out in more detail in STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY, IMMIGRATION AND THE JUDICIARY: LAW
AND POLITICS IN BRITAIN AND AMERICA 208–09 (1987).
60. The latter aspect of Fong Yue Ting is no longer good law. It is now well-settled that
procedural due process constraints apply in deportation proceedings. See, e.g., Wong Yang Sung
v. McGrath, 339 U.S. 33, 50–51 (1950); Yamataya v. Fisher, 189 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1903).
61. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
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[A deportation proceeding] is in no proper sense a trial and sentence for a
crime or offence. It is simply the ascertainment . . . of the fact whether the
conditions exist upon which Congress has enacted that an alien of this class
may remain within the country. The order of deportation is not a punishment
for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in which that word is often
applied to the expulsion of a citizen from his country by way of punishment. It
is but a method of enforcing the return to his own country of an alien who has
not complied with the conditions upon the performance of which the
government of the nation . . . has determined that his continuing to reside here
62
shall depend.

That description did not adequately distinguish deportation from criminal
punishment, because an analogous description might well be offered for
incarceration—probably the clearest form of criminal punishment. One can
scarcely imagine the Court suggesting that a criminal sentence of incarceration
is not punishment because “[i]t is but a method of enforcing [the transfer to a
detention facility of a person] who has not complied with the conditions upon
the performance of which the government of the nation . . . has determined that
his continuing to reside [in society] shall depend.”63 The Court’s conclusion
that deportation is non-punitive seems more definitional than substantive.
The Supreme Court continued in the same vein in Bugajewitz v. Adams.64
There it rejected a noncitizen’s argument that the Ex Post Facto Clause
prohibits Congress from prescribing deportation retroactively—i.e., when the
conduct had not been a basis for deportation at the time the conduct occurred.65
The Court had previously interpreted the Ex Post Facto Clause as applicable
only to criminal punishment.66 In Bugajewitz, the Court dismissed the ex post
facto challenge by labeling deportation non-punitive.67 In support of its
finding, the Court simply said that deportation is merely “a refusal by the
government to harbor persons whom it does not want.”68 That rationale
likewise does little to distinguish deportation from criminal incarceration
because one central purpose of the latter is, similarly, to isolate an undesirable
person from society.

62. Id. The Court declared that a deported alien “has not, therefore, been deprived of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law.” Id. This secondary conclusion is puzzling
because the characterization of a particular consequence as punishment is not now, e.g., Mathews
v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348 (1976); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 270 (1970), and was not
even then, e.g., Windsor v. McVeigh, 93 U.S. 274, 277–78 (1876); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U.S. (1
Wall.) 223, 233 (1863), essential to a due process claim.
63. Fong Yue Ting, 149 U.S. at 730.
64. 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
65. Id. 590–91.
66. Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (1 Dall.) 386, 390 (1798).
67. 228 U.S. at 591.
68. Id.
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From those two early decisions until Padilla, the Supreme Court strictly
adhered to the mantra that deportation is not punishment.69 In doing so, it
added no substantive rationales to the definitional offerings of Fong Yue Ting
and Bugajewitz. In case after case, the Court was content simply to cite what
by then had become a mountain of precedent.70 The case law accumulated.
III. COMPEAN AFTER PADILLA
71

Then came Padilla. Padilla, a lawful permanent resident of the United
States, pleaded guilty in state court to transportation of marijuana.72 The
resulting conviction gave rise to removal proceedings.73 Padilla requested
post-conviction relief on Sixth Amendment grounds of ineffective assistance of
counsel.74 He alleged that his criminal defense attorney had wrongly advised
him that pleading guilty would not lead to deportation and that he would not
have pleaded guilty had he received accurate advice.75 The question before the
Court was the scope of criminal defense counsel’s Sixth Amendment duties
concerning advice about the potential deportation consequences of their
clients’ guilty pleas.76
As noted earlier, pre-Padilla lower courts had divided over that question.77
Driven by the Supreme Court’s consistent pronouncements that deportation is
not punishment, the lower courts had routinely classified deportation as a
purely “collateral” matter rather than a “direct” consequence of a criminal
conviction.78 For that reason, absent legislation to the contrary, the lower
courts had generally held that the criminal trial judge has no duty to advise the
defendant of the potential deportation consequences before accepting a guilty

69. See, e.g., Lapina v. Williams, 232 U.S. 78, 88 (1914); Lewis v. Frick, 233 U.S. 291, 296
(1914); Ng Fung Ho v. White, 259 U.S. 276, 280 (1922); Mahler v. Eby, 264 U.S. 32, 39 (1924);
United States ex rel. Eichenlaub v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 521, 529 n.15 (1950); Harisiades v.
Shaughnessy, 342 U.S. 580, 594–95 (1952); Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 531 (1954); Marcello
v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 314 (1955); Lehmann v. United States ex rel. Carson, 353 U.S. 685, 690
n.4 (1957); Mulcahey v. Catalanotte, 353 U.S. 692, 694 n.5 (1957).
70. See cases cited supra note 69.
71. 130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
72. Id. at 1477.
73. Id. at 1478.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
78. E.g., El-Nobani v. United States, 287 F.3d 417, 421 (6th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Banda, 1 F.3d 354, 356 (5th Cir. 1993) (“We are not aware of any court that has held to the
contrary.”); Varela v. Kaiser, 976 F.2d 1357, 1358 (10th Cir. 1992) (citing a variety of cases from
other circuits that have also reached the conclusion that deportation is a collateral consequence).
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plea.79 The Sixth Amendment duties of defense counsel presented a different
question.
By a vote of 7-2, the Supreme Court held in Padilla that, for Sixth
Amendment purposes, defense counsel has both an affirmative duty to advise a
noncitizen defendant that a guilty plea might lead to deportation and the duty to
avoid mistaken advice on that subject.80 A smaller majority of five Justices
requires counsel to elaborate further when the deportation consequence is
“truly clear,” as it was in Padilla.81
To reach those results, the Court had to rethink traditional judicial
assumptions about the nature of deportation. Its thinking is encapsulated in the
following excerpt:
We have long recognized that deportation is a particularly severe
“penalty,” but it is not, in a strict sense, a criminal sanction. Although removal
proceedings are civil in nature, deportation is nevertheless intimately related to
the criminal process. Our law has enmeshed criminal convictions and the
penalty of deportation for nearly a century. And, importantly, recent changes
in our immigration law have made removal nearly an automatic result for a
broad class of noncitizen offenders. Thus, we find it “most difficult” to
divorce the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context. Moreover,
we are quite confident that noncitizen defendants facing a risk of deportation
for a particular offense find it even more difficult.
Deportation as a consequence of a criminal conviction is, because of its
close connection to the criminal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either
a direct or a collateral consequence. The collateral versus direct distinction is
thus ill-suited to evaluating a Strickland claim concerning the specific risk of
82
deportation.

Thus, in one quick stroke, the Court relegated to the dustbin the long line
of musty cases that had dismissed constitutional challenges to deportation
orders simply by intoning that deportation is not punishment. For the first
time, the Court opted for a functional approach that rests on reality rather than
legal fiction. It felt no need to classify deportation as civil or criminal or to
classify its consequences as collateral or direct. In effect, the Court held
deportation was neither fish nor fowl. It has the feel and some of the attributes
of a civil regulatory model,83 but it is also very closely linked to the criminal
process in ways that the Court spelled out in detail.84 The Court thereby
79. See People v. Pozo, 746 P.2d 523, 526 (Colo. 1987) (offering long string citation of
cases rejecting trial judge duty to advise of risk of deportation before accepting guilty plea).
80. 130 S. Ct. at 1486; id. at 1494 (Alito, J., concurring).
81. Id. at 1483 (majority opinion).
82. Id. at 1481–82 (citations omitted).
83. For the differences between the civil regulatory model and the criminal justice model,
see Legomsky, supra note 3, at 474–75.
84. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1482.
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concluded that deportation occupies a middle ground situated somewhere
between a civil penalty and a criminal punishment.85
But what about those deportation proceedings in which the charge does not
rest on a criminal conviction? Noncitizens are routinely removed from the
United States because of their unlawful presence86 or any number of other
grounds.87 The Court’s emphasis was on the close link between a criminal
conviction and the deportation order that it triggers.88 That theory for
characterizing deportation as a kind of civil-criminal hybrid does not readily
carry over to deportation proceedings that are not grounded on criminal
convictions.
There was, however, another key element of the Court’s rationale. After
exploring the inseparability of deportation from the criminal conviction that
precedes it, the Court added: “The severity of deportation—‘the equivalent of
banishment or exile’—only underscores how critical it is for counsel to inform
her noncitizen client that he faces a risk of deportation.”89 It was not just the
nature of deportation, then, but the severity as well which influenced the Court
to conceptualize deportation as a penalty that defies clear categorization as
civil or criminal. That functional approach has historical echoes,90 reflects the
reality of the legal world in which deportations are carried out, and applies
with equal force to deportations not predicated upon criminal convictions.
Severity alone, of course, does not make a consequence punishment. An
automobile accident can cause death, but that fact alone does not make such
accidents punitive. More is necessary. In the case of deportation, two other

85. Id.
86. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (2006) (present without having been admitted); id. §
1227(a)(1)(B) (present in violation of law); id. § 1227(a)(1)(C)(i) (noncompliance with terms of
nonimmigrant status).
87. See, e.g., id. § 1182(a) (listing grounds of inadmissibility); id. § 1227(a) (listing grounds
of deportability).
88. Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1481–82.
89. Id. at 1486 (quoting Delgadillo v. Carmichael, 332 U.S. 388, 391 (1947)).
90. See James Madison, Madison’s Report on the Virginia Resolutions, in 4 ELLIOT’S
DEBATES ON THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 546, 555 (1836) (“[I]t can never be admitted that the
removal of aliens, authorized by the [Aliens Act], is to be considered, not as punishment for an
offence, but as a measure of precaution and prevention. . . . [I]f a banishment of this sort be not a
punishment, and among the severest of punishments, it will be difficult to imagine a doom to
which the name can be applied.”); see also Galvan v. Press, 347 U.S. 522, 533 (1954) (Black, J.,
dissenting) (“[A deported person] loses his job, his friends, his home, and maybe even his
children, who must choose between their father and their native country.”); Ng Fung Ho v. White,
259 U.S. 276, 284 (1922) (“[Deportation] may result also in loss of both property and life, or of
all that makes life worth living.”); Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, 740 (1893)
(Brewer, J., dissenting) (“Every one knows that to be forcibly taken away from home and family
and friends and business and property, and sent across the ocean to a distant land is
punishment . . . .”).
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elements are present. One is historical. As others have shown, banishment has
been a common form of criminal punishment from ancient times through at
least the nineteenth century.91
Second, the core objectives of deportation overlap substantially, if not
fully, with those of the criminal justice system. I first offered that argument as
a student many years ago,92 and I excavate it here because the Court’s decision
in Padilla gives it contemporary traction. The premise will be that if
constitutional consequences are going to turn on their classification as
punishment, then the classification should reflect the underlying reasons for
prescribing those consequences in the first place. The Supreme Court has
proceeded from that premise in several contexts, including the citizenship
context.93
With that premise, the arguments that I set out in the 1977 student piece
can be summarized briefly: the purposes of deportation bear a striking
resemblance to those of criminal punishment. One traditional purpose of
criminal punishment is incapacitation—isolating an offender from society.94
As discussed earlier, the same can be said of the purpose associated with
deportation—ridding society of a person whose presence in the general
population is undesirable.95 Other traditional purposes of punishment are
specific and general deterrence—discouraging wrongdoers from repeating
deviant behavior and discouraging others from emulating that behavior.96
Deportation could similarly be seen as a vehicle for deterring both the
particular individual and others from future similar acts. The one, admittedly
important, element of criminal punishment that does not correlate with

91. See, e.g., Javier Bleichmar, Deportation as Punishment: A Historical Analysis of the
British Practice of Banishment and Its Impact on Modern Constitutional Law, 14 GEO. IMMIGR.
L.J. 115 (1999); Stephen H. Legomsky, Note, Deportation of an Alien for a Marijuana
Conviction Can Constitute Cruel and Unusual Punishment: Lieggi v. United States Immigration
and Naturalization Service, 13 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 454, 458 (1976); Peter L. Markowitz,
Straddling the Civil-Criminal Divide: A Bifurcated Approach to Understanding the Nature of
Immigration Removal Proceedings, 43 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 289, 320–27 (2008).
92. See Stephen H. Legomsky, The Alien Criminal Defendant: Sentencing Considerations,
15 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 105, 121–27 (1977) (correlating the theories, justifications, and
consequences of deportation with those of criminal punishment).
93. See, e.g., Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144 (1963); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S.
86 (1958) (plurality opinion) (examining whether statutes that purported to take away U.S.
citizenship shared the same purposes as criminal punishment). In applying the constitutional
prohibitions of ex post facto laws and bills of attainder, both clauses that had been interpreted as
limited to punishment, the Supreme Court has similarly classified certain formally civil sanctions
as criminal punishment. See United States v. Lovett, 328 U.S. 303 (1946); Cummings v.
Missouri, 71 U.S. (1 Wall.) 277 (1866).
94. Richard S. Frase, Punishment Purposes, 58 STAN. L. REV. 67, 70 (2005).
95. See Bugajewitz v. Adams, 228 U.S. 585, 591 (1913).
96. Frase, supra note 94, at 70–71.
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deportation quite so precisely is retribution. Even as to that, however,
deportations that are based on the commission of wrongful acts (and that
description could embrace not only post-entry criminal conduct but also illegal
entry and even knowingly overstaying a temporary visa) could well be seen as
retributive.97
Thus, while the Court in Padilla emphasized the functional links between
deportation and criminal justice, the compelling similarities in the objectives of
the two systems reinforce the Court’s characterization of deportation as a civilcriminal hybrid. That characterization, in turn, further strengthens the case for
a constitutional right to the effective assistance of counsel. The same factors
that necessitate such a right in criminal cases suggest a similar result in a
setting that bears so many functional similarities to the criminal justice system.
I do not invoke the Sixth Amendment as the source of that constitutional
right. The Sixth Amendment is, after all, expressly limited to “criminal
prosecutions,”98 and even the Supreme Court in Padilla depicted deportation
proceedings only as a criminal-civil hybrid,99 not a subspecies of criminal
proceedings. Nor do my 1977 arguments demonstrate complete congruence
between the goals of deportation and criminal justice; they suggest only a close
resemblance. The retribution rationale of criminal punishment applies more
clearly to traditional criminal prosecutions than to the deportation sanction.
Rather, my view is that the constitutional right to the effective assistance of
counsel in deportation proceedings is rooted in due process, supported by
sound logic, and now rejuvenated by the persuasive functionality of the
Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla.
One final counter-argument might be anticipated. The constitutional right
recognized in Padilla was a component of a fair procedure in a criminal case.
One might reject the extension of that rationale to deportation proceedings,
whatever similarities they might bear to criminal proceedings, not because of
an increasingly unhelpful distinction between the civil and criminal labels, but
because of the distinction between administrative and criminal penalties. The
latter differential, the argument might run, reflects the long-recognized unique
nature of the criminal sanction. Understandably, the courts have sought to
ensure that the severe consequences of a criminal conviction—the loss of
liberty, the permanent stigma, and all the possible civil disabilities—are not

97. See also Daniel Kanstroom, Deportation, Social Control, and Punishment: Some
Thoughts about Why Hard Laws Make Bad Cases, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1890, 1898 (2000)
(arguing that deportation orders based on post-conviction conduct are punitive in nature);
Markowitz, supra note 91 (correlating the exclusion/deportation distinction with the
civil/criminal distinction).
98. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
99. 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1481 (2010).
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inflicted unless the procedures leave us sufficiently confident that the person is
in fact guilty.
My answer is that that rationale for special procedural safeguards in
criminal cases—a rationale I do not question—has nothing to do with the result
in Padilla. The Court’s reasoning rested neither on the guilt or innocence of
the accused nor on the inherent severity of a criminal conviction. It had
everything to do with the nature and severity of deportation. If deportation is
both so punitive and so serious a consequence that counsel’s failure to advise
about it in a criminal proceeding warrants withdrawal of a guilty plea, then a
fortiori it would seem both punitive enough and serious enough to require
some threshold level of effectiveness in the deportation proceeding itself.
CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court’s decision in Padilla v. Kentucky would have been
noteworthy even if the Court had done nothing more than require criminal
defense counsel to advise their noncitizen clients about the possibility of
deportation. That step alone would have been a giant leap forward in an area
increasingly suffocated by formalities at odds with the reality of deportation.
But the Court in fact did much more—more than even opening the door to the
likelihood of similarly requiring advice concerning collateral consequences
beyond deportation. By abandoning the strict civil-criminal dichotomy that
had isolated deportation from its criminal cousins and accepting a functional
approach that recognized the close resemblance between these two interrelated
legal regimes, the Supreme Court laid the logical foundation for resolving the
constitutional issue raised in Compean. The case for a constitutional right to
the effective assistance of counsel in the deportation proceedings themselves
was strong even before Padilla. It is now compelling.
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